Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Die Schöpfung des Menschen und seiner Ideale. Ein Versuch zur Versöhnung zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft. By *Dr. Wilhelm Haacke.* With sixty-two illustrations. Jena: Hermann Costenoble. 1895. Pages, 487.

Dr. Wilhelm Haacke of Jena, the author of *Die Schöpfung der Thierwelt*, and various other books and essays on similar subjects, has published a new work "The Creation of Man and His Ideals," which he calls in a sub-title "an attempt at a reconciliation between religion and science." We hail the book as a symptom of the times, for it proves that naturalists are beginning to awaken to the importance of the religious problem. Theologians have attempted, in their way, to reconcile science with religion, and have failed. They have aspired to defend their dogmas on the ground of distorted views of natural science. A philosophical solution has been propounded by Herbert Spencer, who, claiming that first principles are unknowable, divides the world into two domains: one, the knowable, for science to investigate; and the other, the unknowable, the haunt of metaphysics, superstitions, and religion. The solution of agnosticism helps religion as little as it does science, for while the main truths of religion are declared to be inaccessible to our comprehension, science is at the same time burdened with the doctrine that the most important facts of life, such as the human soul and the problem of the nature, the existence or non-existence of God, are insolvable riddles. Should not a man trained in the school of natural science be more successful in solving the problem?

Professor Haeckel ventured to propound his monism as the bond between science and religion. But it seems to us, as we stated in a review of his booklet published in *The Open Court*, that he misunderstood the religious import of religious ideas. He failed to understand that religious life belongs to the sphere of psychological, sociological, ethnical, and ethical manifestations, and cannot be regarded merely as an aspect of physics. The idea of God is a concept of moral import, and when Haeckel identifies God with energy and matter (*Kraft und Stoff*) he misses the essential characteristic of God and also of the significance which the idea of God possesses in both the history of mankind and in the life of every single God-believer. Further, when Professor Haeckel identifies the immortality of the soul with the indestructibility of matter and energy, he overlooks the fact that the aspirations of man, which constitute his soul, are not material things, and the preservation of the atoms of which at the time of death a man's body is constituted has nothing to do with the continuance of his ideas and ideals.

Dr. Haacke's book is quite voluminous, but we regret to say that the bulk of it has nothing to do with the problem to which it is devoted. It is rather a review of the various evolution theories measured by the author's own opinion on the subject, while only a few chapters, and especially the superadded part (*Ergänzungstheil*, p. 429), are devoted, to some extent, to the problem of the reconciliation of religion with science.

The introduction declares that the book aims "to propound a world-conception "based upon the evidence of the oneness of the organic and inorganic natural pro"cesses, conceiving religious, artistic, and scientific aspirations in their fundamen"tal unity"; but in spite of this unity of religion, science, and art, the author warns us at once (page 5) not to mix up the domains of knowledge and belief. Yet, if the theologian imagines that this will prove a protection to his dogmas, he is mistaken, for in the first part of the book, which treats of the evidences of the origin of man, Dr. Haacke denies a separate creation, and declares him to have developed from lower ancestors.

In the second part of the book the author reaches his favorite topic; for here he criticises the various evolution theories,—preformation and new-creation, evolution and epigenesis, transformism and creatism. Haacke rejects Darwinism, that is, the doctrine of natural selection, and also its extreme, Weismannism, the theory of germinal selection. The theories of Nägeli, Herbert Spencer, and Eimer are slightly touched upon. Then the methods and results of natural science are briefly surveyed; the import of physiology, the doctrine of the economy of organisms, animal psychology, palæontology, and animal geography are outlined, and the *résumé* is measured by facts. The most important fact, according to Haacke, is the aspiration of organisms to restore the disturbed equilibrium (*Streben nach Wiederherstellung gestörten Gleichgewichts*) which produces their higher and higher consolidation (*Gefügefestigkeit*). This fact, the statement of which is practically the gist of Dr. Haacke's own theory of evolution, is said to be unknown to the Neo-Preformists.

The third part discusses the growth of the various forms of both the inorganic and organic domains. After explaining the nature of crystals and plants, Dr. Haacke speaks of the evolution of animal organisms. "Person" is defined as "an animal form consisting of various layers of cells and in possession of a stomach," There are two kinds of persons: persons without *personelles*, and persons that are in possession of *personelles*, that is to say, such as possess two or more parts which are of equal value. Persons that are in possession of personelles are actinozoans, worms, mollusks, crustacea, articulates, and vertebrates. Man is said to consist of two personelles, both of which possess the same organs (p. 197). After a review of the persons with a fluctuating or a constant number of personelles, with symmetrical and unsymmetrical personelles, etc., etc., Haacke recurs to his law of the organic equilibrium, which serves as a key to all evolutionary problems. In reviewing the older doctrines of creation, Dr. Haacke claims Goethe on account of his *Bildungstrieb* and Karl Ernst von Baer on account of his *Zielstrebigkeit* (page 257), that is to say, an endeavor to attain ends which dominates the entire domain of organised life, as forerunners of his own theory.

The origin of the human form, and of the ancestors of man is the subject of the fourth part. Haacke regards the problem of the unity of mankind as an open question, and he offers on page 314 as a *résumé* a hypothetical sketch of the development of the mammal as an illustration of the way in which the problem of the origin of mankind should be treated.

Next in order is the problem of the creation of the soul to which the fifth part is devoted. Haacke accepts the parallelism of psychical and mechanical processes, but denies that we know anything about the connexion between the two. Sentiency and will are inseparable. Wherever sentiency obtains, there will is. Memory is said to originate through an equilibration of the various sense-organisations which by mutual interaction produce definite parts of transmission. Haacke declares that every atom must in every definite constellation at a given moment possess a definite sensation and a definite will. In addition, the primitive atom is said to be possessed of memory (p. 339). The higher combinations of the primitive atoms, viz., the atoms of the chemical elements, of the chemical molecules, of gemmaria, and of cells, form the degrees of individualisation of memory. On the basis that the primitive atom (whatever that may be) is already endowed with memory (which, in the reviewer's opinion, is a bold and untenable assumption), Haacke builds his theory of the origin of a hereditary memory, and discusses the various instincts, such as nutrition, copulation, locomotion, nest-building.

The fifth part concludes with an investigation of the nature and origin of human ideals, which have developed gradually and in the same way "as the animal soul is produced by a co-operation of its single constituents of which the ultimate particles are the primitive atoms of matter." The definition of an ideal is (on pages 376–581) given in illustrations. The ideal of a crystal is said to be that which is "as characteristic as possible of its kind" (p. 377). We attain the notion of ideals by forming a spiritual image of all crystals of a special kind with which we are acquainted, after an exclusion of all foreign elements and of all their defects. Ideal, accordingly, is "a combination produced by a process of completion which satisfies our innate demand of unification" (p. 379). The formation of our ideals corresponds to material processes in our brain. Supposing we have formed an ideal of a certain thing, we must assume that certain particles of our brain have accordingly assumed a characteristic arrangement. Thus we are again confronted with the law of an aspiration toward an inner equilibrium which here is of a spiritual nature (p. 380). Having given an explanation of the ideal, Haacke discusses the ideals of beauty, morality, and truth, and coming now at last to the problem of the origin of religion, which again is explained as due to an aspiration toward equilibrium, and is defined as "the belief in a moral world-order," Haacke says: "He who does not possess this belief has no religion."

The belief in God originates through the necessity of our being obliged to establish an equilibrium of our spiritual life with the surrounding world (p. 391). Polytheism is reduced by civilised man to monotheism by reducing the many causes to the one single cause of the world. This single cause to the civilised man is God, the God of truth, goodness, and beauty. Haacke adds: "It is God himself who 'reveals himself to us, for God is nothing more nor less than this aspiration 'towards a spiritual equilibrium. The naturalist who investigates the ultimate "secrets of the world, and the artist who realises the highest ideal in his creative "imagination, will both find God in the same way as did the Saviour, whose moral "greatness permitted him to call himself 'the Son of God.' Never a truer word "has been spoken than by Goethe when he said: 'He who possesses science and "art has also religion,' and the origin of religion lies deeply founded in existence" (p. 392).

The sixth part is a cursory treatment of the origin of language, which, however, barely touches the problem.

The seventh part discusses the importance of the doctrine of equilibrium for practical life, in art, science, and religion. Haacke declares that "only such a "religion as allows us to bring our ideals into mutual equilibrium can satisfy our "demands. If we are right, that the activity of the brain consists in the attain'ment of equilibrium, and if we can have a feeling of satisfaction only on the con"dition of, at least to a certain degree, attaining this aim, all those beliefs must be "rejected which prevent us from attaining a psychical equilibrium" (p. 470). In order to preserve the equilibrium, a religious teacher must, according to circumstances, surrender or modify his dogmas. He should not admit rigid doctrines which allow of no adaptation, and the adherence to immutable credos "may even become directly irreligious" (p. 480).

Under the same heading are treated the principles of nationality and cosmopolitism, of socialism and individualism, of morality and law, of education and instruction, and national hygiene.

The most important portion of the book is the *Ergänzungstheil*, the complementary part, a kind of *résumé* of the philosophical principles that underlie Haacke's world-conception. Here he explains his view of the nature of cognition. "The "data of cognition are the various sensations, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, the "touch of resistance and of temperature, and also the combinations of all these "things in time and space. These things are the elements from which our cogni"tion grows. Our perception of them forms the elements of our cognition. Cog"nition consists in our conviction of the necessity of the coincidence of two or "several events, and our knowledge of this necessary coincidence is as much a "matter of immediate certainty as our knowledge of the existence of sensations; it "is of an immediate nature and consists simply in the feeling of satisfaction. A " consideration of the combination of the elementary sensation-complexes leads to " the distinction of extra-sensorial and intra-sensorial processes. The intra-senso- "rial processes constitute our ego, and thus our ego is the totality of all the things "we know. Our ego is identical with our world. My world is my ego. It is the "complex of all cognition elements, concerning the existence of which I possess an "immediate certainty. When investigating the world I naturally investigate my "ego. When amplifying my cognitions, I amplify my ego. When increasing my "knowledge of the world I increase my ego" (p. 438).

Haacke then propounds the question, whether we are justified in considering the molecular complexes of which the extra-sensorial world may be supposed to consist as sensoriums of other egos, and he says: "In order to answer this question "a discussion is necessary concerning the connexion of all things. But of such a "connexion in the knowable and conceivable world we know nothing at all. It can, "in case it exists, only belong to the world which lies beyond limits of natural cog- " nition. Does such a beyond exist, a transcendental world, a metaphysis?"

Haacke is not prepared to deny the question. On the contrary, he believes that he who denies the existence of the transcendental world of a metaphysis would have to deny the existence of sentiency in his neighbors. The pains and pleasures of other people and the manifestations of their will would be non-existent. He declares that the problem of the existence of a metaphysis does not concern the naturalist. It is a matter of the speculative philosopher, and he, too, is unable to make any definite statements. For, "how can one describe something that is inaccessible to cognition" (p. 443). The realm of metaphysis lies as its name indicates, beyond the limits of natural cognition, "What I can represent in thought does not belong to the domain of metaphysis" (p. 446).

In all these expositions Dr. Haacke shows, in our opinion, a decided lack of knowledge as to the nature of the metaphysical problem, and his own statements are by no means free from contradictions; for a closer study of the nature of the metaphysis will either reveal to him that metaphysis is the psychical correlative of bodily appearance, and as such it is by no means unrepresentable in thought, or, it means some superadded unknowable cause of the real facts of nature, both psychical and physical, and in that case it is a redundant assumption which will avail nothing in the explanation of the world.[2]

The essence of Professor Haacke's book is summed up in the concluding remarks of the *Ergänzungstheil* on pages 459–461, and as they contain in pregnant form all the points on which we disagree from Dr. Haacke, we deem it best to translate the whole passage which is headed "The Possibility of a Teleological World-Conception," and reads as follows:

---

[1] An exhaustive discussion of the problem, in which our own standpoint is set forth, has been published in *The Monist*, Vol. V., No. 4, under the title of "The Metaphysical x in Cognition."

"Teleological is the world-conception which claims that the world-process has "a purpose. We have to declare explicitly that a naturalist has nothing to do with "teleology or the doctrine of purpose, for the question of the existence or non-ex-"istence of a world-purpose is absolutely unanswerable, since it concerns the meta-"physis. Natural science can regard the mechanistic world-conception alone as "admissible. Thus a naturalist has nothing whatever to do with the question "[mentioned on page 184 of Haacke's book] whether a transformation of the blos-"soms of *Campanula glomerata* in which the three carpels are sometimes replaced "by two is teleological or not. He has to deal with the causes only of this trans-"formation. When entering upon the question concerning their purpose or lack "of purpose, he would foolishly venture beyond the limits of natural cognition into "the realm of the metaphysis, and within the domain of his science any investiga-"tion of the metaphysis is forbidden.

"It is strange that Darwinism is constantly praised as the highest wisdom of "the mechanistic world-conception and the highest triumph of natural science, "while it should have been denounced long ago for tasting of the fruits of the tree "of metaphysical cognition forbidden to natural science because absolutely impos-"sible. Darwinism maintains that the world has no purpose for Darwinism is the "doctrine of selection,—the doctrine of a selection of that which is accidentally "favored. The doctrine of the survival of that which happens to be the fittest. "But by maintaining that the world has no purpose, Darwinism blindly enters the "domain of the metaphysis which is forever closed to science. In Darwin, who by "propounding his theory of natural selection unknowingly overstepped the limits "of natural cognition, the abhorrence of the Anglo-saxon to all so-called 'abstruse' "investigations found its punishment. Had he busied himself more with 'ab-"struse' things, he might have recognised that his theory which for the sake of "being entitled to existence must deny a world-purpose and thus become meta-"physics ventured upon the 'abstrusest' of all domains, upon the domain of meta-"physics. And most of the naturalists of the 'nation of thinkers' followed him "upon this domain with noisy drums in a jubilant parade and began to propound "theories which in their blindness they called anti-metaphysical. However, one "of them might illustrate even to the most shortsighted, that their theories are ac-"tually metaphysical, I mean the author of the pamphlet on the 'Omnipotence of "Natural Selection.'

"But though the naturalist must keep his science clear of metaphysical con-"considerations, he, as an aspiring man is allowed to overstep the limits of natural "science so as to propound for his own person the question whether the world has "a purpose and whether, accordingly, human existence is worth living. Darwin "certainly would have been entitled for his own person to deny a world-purpose, "for that is a problem which he has to settle with himself and with his God alone, "(supposing that he had a God,) which, however, does not concern natural science, "for natural science is and must remain mechanistic. Natural science is allowed "to become metaphysical only in so far as she propounds the mechanism as a "world-principle. However, as Darwin was allowed to propound privately for him-"self an anti-teleological metaphysics, every one else is allowed privately to estab-"lish a teleological metaphysics.

"We have the choice between a wild chaos and an orderly purpose-regulated 'cosmos, and I believe that he is mistaken who trusts that the choice of most peo-'ple will be the chaos.

"However that may be, the world-conception here developed gives to science 'what belongs to science and leaves everybody at liberty to give to God what be-"longs to God."

In reply to this sample of Dr. Haacke's metaphysics, we have to make three remarks. First, on the meaning and scientific import of the word *teleology*. Secondly, on the corollaries of Darwinism which Haacke imputes to Darwin and to the Darwinists, and lastly, on the relation of the God-idea to metaphysics.

Teleology is derived from a Greek word, *telos*, which means "aim, goal, end, or purpose." The question whether the world has a *telos* or not lies by no means beyond the limits of science; firstly because there are no limits to science, for science investigates everything that comes within the ken of the human mind and grapples with every problem that in the course of our mental evolution presents itself. If there is a problem that is *per se* insolvable, we may rest assured that the problem is illegitimate, that is to say, it is wrongly formulated. Secondly, to say that natural science should investigate the causes alone and not the ends or aims or purposes of natural events, is about the same as to declare that we must fix the direction whence a bullet comes but should not ask whither it flies. The solution of the "whence" settles the "whither." The two questions concerning the causes and the ends of motions are inseparable. We cannot investigate the former without gaining an insight into the latter. Thus to investigate the existence or non-existence of a world-purpose is not only not forbidden to natural science but is its main duty. If natural science has nothing to say on this main problem of all problems, we had better give up natural science and resign all attempts at investigating nature.

The confusion by which Dr. Haacke is bewildered, originates, here as in so many other questions, in the misconception of what is meant by *cause*. The word *cause* is sometimes used in its legitimate sense as "that event which through a transformation of circumstances produces a new state of things called the effect." And then again it is used in the sense of *raison d'être*, ground or reason. Whenever we know the *raison d'être* of an event, we know its end, or aim, or purpose. If we are familiar with the nature of gravity we know that the stone tends toward the centre of the earth, that is to say, the centre of the earth is the aim of the stone. If we are familiar with the motives of a man, which in their totality we call his character, we know the aims or purposes of his actions.

The Greek word *telos* means both "aim" and "purpose," and in modern languages we distinguish between an aim that is unconsciously pursued, as the aim of a falling stone, and an aim that is consciously pursued as the end in view of an intelligent creature. The problem of the world-purpose is by no means as Haacke assumes, insolvable. The theory of evolution is an unmistakable answer to the question of the aim of the world-process, of the law that regulates the main tendencies of all motions and aspirations. Certainly the world-process, that is to say, animated life such as it appears upon earth, does not at its very beginning pursue a purpose, and its aim is not planned by a mind in the fashion of human purposes, but there can be no question about it that the evolution of life pursues a definite direction, the recognition of which is the most important problem of the science of life in its broadest aspect.

Darwinism, as the word is used by Dr. Haacke, is a man of straw whom he can thrash at pleasure. For who, or what is this Darwinism? But Dr. Haacke should remember that the thrashing of straw is a pretty useless performance. If Darwinism means the doctrine of Darwinists, Dr. Haacke should consider that there are Darwinists who believe that the world has no purpose, and there are other Darwinists who believe that the world has a purpose. If he wishes to criticise the former, he had better have quoted the very words of those Darwinists whom he intended to criticise, for it seems to us that it would be very difficult to find Darwinists who accept the conclusions which Dr. Haacke imputes to them. If, however, by Darwinism is meant the doctrine of Darwin himself, it appears to the reviewer that Dr. Haacke is extremely unjust to the great naturalist. Indeed Dr. Haacke's book is full of the most unfair accusations of Darwin, which would be very difficult for him to prove. Any one who has read Darwin knows that no naturalist was so careful to avoid metaphysical speculations and to confine himself to the mere statement of facts. If Haacke intends to criticise Darwin's metaphysicism, he should first state Darwin's propositions impartially and not with additions. Darwin never spoke of the survival of those that happen to be the fittest, but to use the current phrase, simply of the survival of the fittest. Dr. Haacke's criticism applies merely to that which he imputed to Darwin, not to that which Darwin said himself.

Dr. Haacke's reconciliation between religion and science consists in a bi-partition of the world, one half of which is surrendered to science, and the other to God. Thus, God is relegated to a realm inaccessible to science which naturally must stamp upon atheism the imprint of a scientific justification, and science is contrasted to God in such a way as to justify that hatred of science which is so common among fanatics and bigots who denounce science as ungodly and irreligious, because they anticipate from it the destruction of their irrational credos and other dear prejudices. How little tenable Dr. Haacke's proposition is may be learned from the fact that on page 392 he himself, in contradiction to his own principles of excluding metaphysics from the domain of the knowable, defines God as "man's aspiration toward a spiritual equilibrium." Thus, God is to him neither unknowable nor metaphysical, nor transcendental; God is, according to Haacke's own definition, the very kernel of man's moral being and the most important part of his soul. The nature of God, accordingly, would not be a mere private affair concerning which no one has a right to propound an opinion except quite privately for himself alone; but it would be the most important problem of life, the discussion of which could not and should not be avoided in the most important sciences, which are ethics, psychology, sociology, and also political economy. And this paramount importance of the religious problem, is the position which we have always maintained in all our publications,—in *The Open Court*, in *The Monist*, and in the books that have been brought out by The Open Court Publishing Company.

So long as a man's notion of God is simply an external acceptance of the traditional image of the Deity as it is represented in the symbolical books of the Church, he cannot distinguish between the essential and unessential, between the truth and the allegorical form in which the truth is represented. The existence of such a God cannot be demonstrated, he has simply to be postulated (to use the slang of Kantian philosophy). But after all, what a poor God is the God that must be postulated! For it matters little whether or not a being or a thing exists that lies without the pale of all possible experience.

How radical is the change as soon as we attempt to reduce our notion of God to terms of our life-experiences. Instead of starting with a postulate that never can be proved, we investigate facts and discern between the eternal and the transient; the immutable or everlasting, and the perishable or ever changing; the universal and the particular. The former is the divine, the latter characterises the phenomenal of the creation. The divine, as the law of being, becomes to sentient and aspiring creatures the norm of conduct, for it enforces obedience on penalty of perdition and constitutes the ultimate authority of morality. This is what we call the superpersonal God of the Religion of Science. Whether or not we choose to call this omnipresent reality "God," it is here in us as the most essential part of our experiences and it is also traceable in the world that surrounds us. It is immanent in the universe as the cosmic order of nature, and it is, at the same time, supernatural as the condition of any possible kind of world, for indeed we may imagine that other worlds consisting of some other material existed besides this actual world of ours, but it is impossible that there be any world in which the universal laws (such as are formulated in logic, arithmetic, and the other formal sciences) would have no application.

While we propose a solution of the religious problem that widely differs from the conciliation between religion and science as offered by Dr. Haacke, we heartily recommend his book to a friendly, albeit, at the same time, a critical perusal. P.C.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit. By *Dr. Rudolf Steiner*. Weimar: Emil Felber. 1895. Pages, 125.

It is probable that Friedrich Nietzsche, in spite of his erratic and almost insane views, will come to the front in Germany and perhaps even in our country. The